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IN RE 2012 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTING: MARYLAND HIGH 
COURT DECISION EXEMPLIFIES LACKLUSTER 
 FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON REDISTRICTING 
MATTHEW LAGARDE∗ 
Days after the beginning of his administration in January 2009, Presi-
dent Barack Obama shut down an argument with then-House Republican 
Whip Eric Cantor by informing Congressman Cantor that “[e]lections have 
consequences.”1  What has become increasingly clear in recent years is that 
state elections—particularly state elections conducted immediately prior to 
a national census and subsequent redistricting—may have profound conse-
quences on future elections.2  Since the Supreme Court decided that parti-
san gerrymandering claims are justiciable in Davis v. Bandemer3 nearly 
thirty years ago, state and federal judiciaries have wrestled with applying 
the Court’s holding to claims of state partisan gerrymandering.4  In In re 
2012 Legislative Districting,5 the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the 
legislative apportionment plan (“the Redistricting Plan”) passed by the 
Maryland State Legislature in 2012 following the 2010 United States Cen-
sus.6  This Note will argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it distin-
guished the Maryland Redistricting Plan from the Georgia apportionment 
plan reviewed in Larios v. Cox,7 and should instead have struck down the 
Redistricting Plan as partisan discrimination in violation of the “one person, 
one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.8  More fundamentally, this Note argues that the standard ap-
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 1.  New Business, How the Political Gridlock in Washington Might End, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_10/b4169000096164.htm. 
 2.  See infra Part IV; see also Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-
2012.html (“The $30 million strategy consists of two steps for tilting the playing field: take over 
state legislatures before the decennial Census, then redraw state and Congressional districts to 
lock in partisan advantages.  The plan was highly successful.”). 
 3.  478 U.S. 109 (1986).   
 4.  See infra Part II.B.1.  For a definition of gerrymandering, see infra notes 33, 36. 
 5.  436 Md. 121, 80 A.3d 1073 (2013).   
 6.  Id. at 130, 80 A.3d at 1077; see infra Part III. 
 7.  300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).  The Larios court reviewed 
the constitutionality of a state legislative redistricting plan similar to the one put in place in Mary-
land.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
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plied by the Court of Appeals in reaching its decision was internally inco-
herent and stands as an unfortunate descendant of the Supreme Court’s am-
biguous and impracticable opinion in Davis.9  The Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion, including its failure to articulate a practicable standard by which to 
judge future redistricting efforts, marks another step in the continuing ero-
sion of the public’s faith in the integrity of the electoral system.10 
I.  THE CASE 
The 2010 Census found that Maryland had an adjusted population of 
5,772,231 residents.11  The Maryland Legislature consists of forty-seven 
Legislative Districts containing forty-seven Senators and 141 Delegates.12  
Pursuant to the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution,13 this translates to 122,813 resi-
dents in an ideal Legislative District, and 40,938 residents in an ideal sin-
gle-member Delegate Subdistrict.14  According to the standard for “substan-
tial equality across legislative districts,” requiring a population variance no 
greater than ten percent between the most populous and least populous dis-
tricts,15 the largest district in Maryland should contain no more than 
128,953 people, and the smallest no fewer than 116,673 people.16 
Article III, Section five of the Maryland Constitution requires that 
within two years of each United States Census, the State’s forty-seven leg-
islative districts be reapportioned.17  Following the 2010 Census, Mary-
land’s Governor Martin O’Malley convened the Governor’s Redistricting 
Advisory Committee (“GRAC”).18  The GRAC was formed to hold public 
                                                          
 9.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 11.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 131, 80 A.3d at 1078.  Pursuant to Mary-
land’s No Representation Without Population Act of 2010, Maryland census data “must be adjust-
ed to reassign Maryland residents in correctional institutions to their last known address and to 
exclude out-of-state residents in correctional institutions from redistricting.”  No Representation 
Without Population Act, MARYLAND DEP’T OF PLANNING, 
http://www.planning.maryland.gov/Redistricting/2010/newLaw.shtml (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
 12.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 127 & n.2, 80 A.3d at 1076 & n.2. 
 13.  See infra Part II.A. 
 14.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 131, 80 A.3d at 1078. 
 15.  See infra Part II.C. 
 16.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 156–57, 80 A.3d at 1093 (citing Voinovich 
v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983)). 
 17.  MD. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
 18.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 128, 80 A.3d at 1076.  Members of the 
GRAC included:  
Jeanne D. Hitchcock, Esq., the Governor’s Appointments Secretary, as Chair; Thomas 
V. Mike Miller, Jr., President of the Maryland Senate; Michael E. Busch, Speaker of 
the Maryland House of Delegates; James King, a former member of the House of Dele-
gates from Anne Arundel County; and Richard Stewart, Chief Executive Officer of 
Montgomery Mechanical Services.   
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hearings, accept public comment, and draft a plan for the legislative reap-
portionment.19  Of the active politicians involved in the redistricting effort, 
Governor Martin O’Malley (represented by Ms. Hitchcock) was a Demo-
crat;20 Speaker Michael Busch was a Democrat;21 and Senate President 
Thomas Mike Miller was a Democrat.22  Mr. Richard Stewart also was a 
Democrat.23  The lone Republican on the GRAC was former Delegate 
James King.24 
In December 2011, the GRAC published the Redistricting Plan, which 
the Governor then presented to the Maryland General Assembly.25  In addi-
tion to the statistical evidence of partisan gerrymandering described in the 
next paragraph, the Redistricting Plan contained districts that are conspicu-
ously not compact.26  For instance, Maryland’s 3rd District winds a twisting 
path along and away from the Chesapeake Bay, including suburbs to the 
north of Washington, D.C., as well as the western shore of the Chesapeake 
Bay, Annapolis, a small part of East Baltimore, another Baltimore City 
neighborhood near Clifton Park, and parts of suburbs to the northeast and 
the northwest of Baltimore.27  No alternative redistricting plan was intro-
duced by the General Assembly, and the Plan became law on February 24, 
2012.28  At the time the Plan became law, the Maryland Senate contained 
                                                          
Id. at 128 n.5, 80 A.3d at 1076 n.5. 
 19.  Id. at 128, 80 A.3d at 1076. 
 20.  Biography of Martin J. O’Malley, MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/gov/former/html/msa13090.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
 21.  Biography of Michael E. Busch, MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/06hse/html/msa12196.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
 22.  Biography of Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/05sen/html/msa01619.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
 23.  Report of the Special Master at 2 n.1 (Sept. 2012), [hereinafter Special Master Report], 
available at 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/highlightedcases/2012districting/specialmastersreport.pd
f. 
 24.  Biography of James J. King, MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/06hse/former/html/msa14622.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014). 
 25.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. 121, 128, 80 A.3d 1073, 1076 (2013). 
 26.  Most courts determine whether a district is “compact” by an intuitive “eyeball” test—a 
district is considered to be compact if it looks compact and is similar in shape to other districts in 
the state.  Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable 
Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 
262 (2009). 
 27.  AZAVEA, REDRAWING THE MAP ON REDISTRICTING 2012 ADDENDUM 5 (2012), availa-
ble at 
http://cdn.azavea.com/com.redistrictingthenation/pdfs/Redistricting_The_Nation_Addendum.pdf. 
 28.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 127–28, 80 A.3d at 1076. 
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thirty-five Democrats and twelve Republicans;29 the Maryland House con-
tained ninety-eight Democrats and forty-three Republicans;30 and the Gov-
ernor was a Democrat.31 
Petitioner Cynthia Houser was the named party in a group of twenty-
two voters from twelve legislative districts.32  Houser filed a petition alleg-
ing that, inter alia, the Redistricting Plan violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because it contained impermissible partisan discrimination.33  Spe-
cifically, Houser alleged that while the Redistricting Plan did not violate the 
ten percent rule,34 the Redistricting Plan’s maximum deviation nearly vio-
lated the rule at 9.41%.35  Moreover, thirty-nine of the forty-two districts 
that voted for the Republican candidates for President and Governor were 
overpopulated in the Redistricting Plan,36 twenty-five by more than four 
percent.37  On the other hand, sixteen of twenty-one of the comparatively 
urban areas of Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, and Balti-
more City—all Democratic strongholds—were underpopulated.38  Of the 
thirty-seven majority African-American delegate districts—also strongly 
aligned with the Democratic Party—thirty were underpopulated, twenty-
                                                          
 29.  2012 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN COMPOSITION, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (June 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2012_legis_and_state.pdf. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See Biography of Martin J. O’Malley, supra note 20. 
 32.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 159, 80 A.3d at 1094–95.  Other petitioners 
filed claims arguing the unconstitutionality of the redistricting plan on separate grounds; however, 
Houser’s are the only claims alleging impermissible partisan discrimination, and therefore, her 
petition is the only relevant one for the purposes of this Note. 
 33.  Id., 80 A.3d at 1095.  Impermissible political discrimination, also known as “gerryman-
dering,” has been described by the Supreme Court as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of 
district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes.”  Kirkpatrick v. 
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969).  While many commentators attempt to distinguish between 
“one person, one vote” violations and “gerrymandering,” the Court of Appeals correctly recog-
nized such violations as simply a means of gerrymandering (or of other types of discrimination).  
In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 182, 80 A.3d at 1108. 
 34.  See id. at 156–57, 80 A.3d at 1093 (describing the standard for “substantial equality 
across legislative districts” as requiring a population variance no greater than ten percent between 
the most populous and least populous districts); see also infra Part II.C.  
 35.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 161, 80 A.3d at 1096. 
 36.  Strategically “overpopulating” and “underpopulating” certain districts is a classic method 
of gerrymandering.  A gerrymandered plan will pack as many people as possible into districts 
likely to vote for the opposing political party, while putting as few people as possible in districts 
likely to vote for incumbents, thus blunting the ability of the opposing party to gain a numeric ad-
vantage in the legislature.  See Kristina Betts, Redistricting: Who Should Draw the Lines? The 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as a Model for Change, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 171, 
184–85 (2006). 
 37.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 161, 80 A.3d at 1096. 
 38.  Id. 
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eight by more than four percent, and twenty-five of those by 4.49% or 
more.39 
In response to a motion filed by the Maryland Attorney General re-
questing that the Court of Appeals issue procedures for filing challenges to 
the Redistricting Plan, the Court of Appeals named Alan M. Wilner, a re-
tired judge of the Court of Appeals, as the Court’s Special Master, and em-
powered him to conduct any required hearings.40  Judge Wilner conducted 
hearings on September 5, 2012, and parties were permitted to submit expert 
reports and other evidence without objection.41  The Special Master issued a 
recommendation that challenges to the Redistricting Plan be denied.42  The 
parties filed exceptions, and the Court of Appeals heard oral arguments re-
garding whether the Redistricting Plan violated the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 or the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Maryland.43 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Beginning with Reynolds v. Sims44 roughly fifty years ago, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require that 
states “construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable.”45  In a related decision, Davis v. 
Bandemer,46 the Supreme Court found in 1986 that partisan gerrymandering 
claims were justiciable, although that was the sole issue to which a majority 
of the Court could agree—only a plurality of the Court was able to con-
verge on a standard.47  In 2004, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,48 the Supreme Court 
attempted once again to create a standard for adjudicating claims of partisan 
gerrymandering but ultimately arrived at the same result it did in Davis: 
while five justices concluded that such claims were properly justiciable, no 
majority was able to agree upon a standard.49  In place of a comprehensive 
standard, the Supreme Court has only set certain parameters around the pe-
riphery of the issue, including holding that “de minimis” population devia-
tions of less than ten percent are insufficient by themselves to establish a 
prima facie case of impermissible partisan discrimination.50 
                                                          
 39.  Id. at 161 n.27, 80 A.3d at 1096 n.27. 
 40.  Id. at 128–29, 80 A.3d at 1077. 
 41.  Id. at 129, 80 A.3d at 1077. 
 42.  Id. at 129–30, 80 A.3d at 1077; Special Master Report at 19, 34, 74. 
 43.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 130, 138, 144, 159–60, 80 A.3d at 1077, 
1082, 1086, 1095. 
 44.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 45.  Id. at 577; see infra Part II.A. 
 46.  478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 47.  Id. at 113; see infra Part II.B.1. 
 48.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 49.  See infra Part II. B.2. 
 50.  See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  The Supreme Court Has Interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to 
Require States to Construct Districts as Close in Population as 
Practicable 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”51  Beginning approximately 
fifty years ago in Reynolds v. Sims,52 the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Equal Protection Clause as requiring that States make a good-faith effort to 
construct legislative districts that are “as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable.”53  This has come to be known as the “one person, one vote” 
doctrine.54  The doctrine derives from the Court’s reasoning that 
“[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres.”55  The Court explained 
that if the populations of voting districts are manipulated, the discriminatory 
effect on the voters living in overpopulated areas would be mathematically 
demonstrable.56  Stated differently, “[o]verweighting and overvaluation of 
the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and underval-
uation of the votes of those living there.”57 
In the same term as Reynolds, the Supreme Court decided Roman v. 
Sincock,58 which found that courts should not attempt to establish “rigid 
mathematical standards” for reviewing state legislative redistricting plans 
for constitutional validity under the Equal Protection Clause.59  Instead, the 
Court required that state governments could only deviate from population-
based representation based on factors free from “any taint of arbitrariness or 
discrimination.”60  Both Reynolds and Roman involved allegations of legis-
lative districts that had become outdated over time, resulting in the effective 
devaluation of the votes of those living in districts that had become over-
populated.61  Thus, neither case involved claims of political gerrymander-
ing. 
                                                          
 51.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 52.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 53.  Id. at 577. 
 54.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986).  
 55.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. 
 56.  Id. at 563. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  377 U.S. 695 (1964). 
 59.  Id. at 710. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540; Roman, 377 U.S. at 704–05. 
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B.  Although It Has Declined to Find Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
Non-Justiciable, the Court Has Yet to Identify a Controlling 
Standard 
On multiple occasions, the Court has addressed a two-part question: 
(1) are partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable; and (2) if so, by what 
standard should such claims be adjudicated?62  Each time, the Court has 
held that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable but was unable to 
form a majority to agree upon a standard by which to evaluate such 
claims.63 
1.  Davis v. Bandemer Represented the Supreme Court’s Original 
Attempt at Producing a Standard for Reviewing Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims but Failed to Produce a Majority on 
That Issue 
The Court confronted the issue of whether partisan gerrymandering 
claims were justiciable in the 1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer.64  In Davis, 
the Court held that a claim alleging unconstitutional political gerrymander-
ing was indistinguishable from racial gerrymandering claims for the pur-
poses of justiciability.65  The Court further held that in order for a com-
plainant to demonstrate unconstitutional partisan discrimination, the com-
complainant would need to demonstrate intentional discrimination that had 
an actual discriminatory effect on an identifiable political group.66  The 
Court stated that a certain level of discriminatory intent and outcome from 
redistricting was unavoidable,67 and that a successful complainant would 
need to demonstrate that the electoral system had been “arranged in a man-
ner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence 
on the political process as a whole.”68 
Davis involved a challenge brought against the 1981 Indiana State leg-
islative reapportionment on the basis that it discriminated against Demo-
crats.69  The posture of this case was notable in that the trial court was able 
to examine the “results” of the redistricting because the State held an elec-
tion between the reapportionment and the trial.70  In that election, Demo-
crats received 51.9% of the votes in the House races statewide, but garnered 
                                                          
 62.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 63.  See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 64.  478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 65.  Id. at 125. 
 66.  Id. at 127. 
 67.  Id. at 128–29 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)). 
 68.  Id. at 132. 
 69.  Id. at 113. 
 70.  Id. at 115. 
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just forty-three of the 100 available House seats.71  In two counties that the 
Democrats alleged were particularly heavily gerrymandered, Democratic 
candidates won 46.6% of the vote and secured just three of the twenty-one 
available House seats in the county.72 
The Supreme Court first turned to the question of whether political 
gerrymandering claims of this nature were justiciable.73  It addressed the 
argument that such claims ought not be justiciable pursuant to the “political 
question” doctrine, which, under the test articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Baker v. Carr,74 provides that the courts may not address questions 
which have been constitutionally committed to other branches of govern-
ment or for which judicially manageable standards for resolving the claim 
are not available.75  The Court explained that the “political question” doc-
trine analysis it undertook in Baker, in which it resolved an equal protection 
claim based on what was effectively a “one person, one vote” violation,76 
applied equally to equal protection claims alleging political gerrymander-
ing.77  In her concurrence in judgment, Justice O’Connor stated that there 
existed “intractable difficulties in deriving a judicially manageable standard 
from the Equal Protection Clause for adjudicating political gerrymandering 
claims.”78  The Part II majority rejected this argument, finding that Justice 
O’ Connor failed to articulate how the plurality’s standard was any less 
manageable than the standard the courts had long used to adjudicate racial 
                                                          
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 118.   
 74.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 75.  Id. at 210, 217. 
 76.  Baker was decided prior to the articulation of the “one person, one vote” doctrine in 
Reynolds.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 123. 
 77.  The Davis Court explained:  
In holding that claim to be justiciable, the Court concluded that none of the identifying 
characteristics of a political question were present: “The question here is the consisten-
cy of state action with the Federal Constitution.  We have no question decided, or to be 
decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this Court.  Nor do we risk 
embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue 
with Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged.  Nor need the 
appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon policy deter-
minations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.  Judicial standards 
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open 
to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the par-
ticular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and 
capricious action.”   
  This analysis applies equally to the question now before us.  
478 U.S. at 122–23 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 226). 
 78.  Id. at 155 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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gerrymandering claims.79  Accordingly, the Court found that political ger-
rymandering claims were justiciable.80 
The Court next turned to its equal protection analysis.81  The Davis 
plurality found that for the plaintiffs to succeed, they must demonstrate 
“both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and 
an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”82  This so-called “intent plus 
effects” requirement is a well-established part of equal protection jurispru-
dence.  The requirement has featured prominently in equal protection cases 
in which plaintiffs allege that a defendant’s actions had a racially disparate 
impact.  For instance, in Washington v. Davis,83 the Court held that official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact, and that racially discriminatory intent or purpose 
also is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.84  The 
following year, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp.,85 the Supreme Court upheld but weakened this stand-
ard, holding, inter alia, that the impact of a law can be so clearly discrimina-
tory as to allow no other explanation than that it was adopted for impermis-
sible purposes.86  While the language is slightly different in the racially 
disparate impact cases, the relationship is clear: the “intent plus effects” re-
quired by the Davis plurality is equal to and derived from the “purpose plus 
impact” requirements in Washington and its predecessors.87 
The plurality opinion in Davis, however, stressed that political out-
comes from redistricting, and thus political considerations while redistrict-
ing, were unavoidable.88  Consequently, according to the Davis plurality, a 
certain baseline level of intent plus effects was inextricable from the redis-
tricting process.89  To demonstrate unconstitutional partisan discrimination, 
                                                          
 79.  Id. at 125 (majority opinion).  While Justice White’s opinion in Davis is a plurality opin-
ion, a majority of the Justices joined in Part II of the opinion, which held that political gerryman-
dering claims are justiciable.   
 80.  Id. at 125, 127.  
 81.  While the plurality’s equal protection analysis was not binding on future Supreme Court 
decisions, it formed the basis for the equal protection analysis that has occurred in the lower courts 
after Davis.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (“Nor can it be said that the lower 
courts have, over 18 years, succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable 
to enunciate.  They have simply applied the standard set forth in Bandemer’s four-Justice plurality 
opinion.”). 
 82.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 127. 
 83.  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 84.  Id. at 239. 
 85.  429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 86.  Id. at 266 (“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerg-
es from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its 
face.”). 
 87.  See Davis, 478 U.S. at 127. 
 88.  Id. at 128–29.   
 89.  Id. 
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therefore, the Court required that a complainant demonstrate that the elec-
toral system had been “arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a 
voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a 
whole.”90  The Court further clarified that even with evidence showing that 
the state legislature intentionally set out to disadvantage a political party’s 
electoral chances, such intentional discrimination would not be unconstitu-
tional without a subsequent effect—that is, evidence that the disadvantaged 
party had, in fact, been adversely affected in subsequent elections.91  Even 
this rigorous burden, however, was not enough.92  The Court provided that 
disproportionate results in one election would not be sufficient to indicate a 
constitutional violation and held that it would only find an equal protection 
violation “where a history of disproportionate results appeared in conjunc-
tion with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair rep-
resentation.”93  Applying this lofty standard to the facts presented, the plu-
rality found that the Davis plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case 
of unconstitutional partisan discrimination.94 
2.  Eighteen Years After Davis, the Supreme Court Revisited the 
Question and Yet Again Emerged Without a Majority Standard 
The Davis holding that political gerrymandering claims were justicia-
ble would later be harshly criticized by the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Ju-
belirer.95  Although Vieth did not overturn Davis,96 the Vieth plurality, led 
by Justice Scalia, condemned the Davis plurality’s reasoning, finding that 
the Davis Court had only found that political gerrymandering claims were 
justiciable because it had not been persuaded that no “judicially discernible 
and manageable standards” for managing such claims existed.97  The Vieth 
plurality described this “shifting of the burden” as “clumsy” and noted that 
no majority existed as to what such judicially discernable standards might 
be.98  The Vieth plurality stated that in the eighteen years since Davis, no 
legislative or majority standard had been created to fill that void,99 and fur-
ther noted that lower courts had similarly been unable to craft a standard of 
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 132. 
 91.  Id. at 139. 
 92.  While equal protection scholars may question the notion that “intent plus effects” is a 
particularly rigorous burden, see infra Part IV.B. for a discussion regarding why this requirement 
is impracticable in this context. 
 93.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 139. 
 94.  Id. at 134. 
 95.  541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004). 
 96.  A majority of the Justices held in concurring and dissenting opinions that political gerry-
mandering claims remained justiciable.  Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Id. at 278 (plurality opinion) (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 123) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 98.  Id. at 278–79. 
 99.  Id. at 279. 
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their own with which to resolve the question left open by the Supreme 
Court.100  The Vieth plurality cited this ongoing failure to develop a stand-
ard for adjudicating claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering as 
the basis for its argument that no manageable standards for adjudicating 
such claims exists.101  The plurality concluded that “[l]acking [such stand-
ards], we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusti-
ciable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.”102 
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Kennedy joined with the 
four dissenting Justices103 in rejecting the plurality’s reasoning and opinion 
on the question of justiciability.104  This left undisturbed the Davis v. 
Bandemer holding that unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering claims 
were justiciable.  Justice Kennedy explained that the mere fact that the 
courts had not yet been able to articulate a standard for adjudicating partisan 
gerrymandering claims did not preclude such a standard from being devel-
oped.105  Moreover, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[w]here important rights 
are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err 
on the side of caution.”106  The sentiment expressed by Justice Kennedy 
here echoes that of the Supreme Court in 1964 in Reynolds v. Sims, which 
stated: 
 We are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a 
state legislature is a complex and many-faceted one.  We are ad-
vised that States can rationally consider factors other than popula-
tion in apportioning legislative representation.  We are admon-
ished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing 
views as to political philosophy on their citizens.  We are cau-
tioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and 
mathematical quagmires.  Our answer is this: a denial of constitu-
tionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and 
our office require no less of us.107 
Notably, as Justice Kennedy states in his opinion concurring in the 
judgment,108 even the Vieth plurality does not disagree with the judgment 
that “severe partisan gerrymander[ing]” is “incompatib[le] . . . with demo-
cratic principles.”109  The Vieth plurality further agreed with Justice Stevens 
                                                          
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 281. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 104.  Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 105.  Id. at 311. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
 108.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 109.  Id. at 292 (plurality opinion). 
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in opining “that an excessive injection of politics [into redistricting] is un-
lawful.”110  All of the dissenting and concurring Justices agree with these 
principles.  What the Justices were still unable to agree on in Vieth, as in 
Davis, was what standard ought to be applied to partisan gerrymandering 
claims.111  As a result, the lower courts remain in the same quandary they 
have been in for almost thirty years: political gerrymandering claims are 
justiciable, but the Court has yet to offer more than an impracticable plurali-
ty standard for how such cases should be reviewed.112 
C.  De Minimis Population Deviations of Under Ten Percent Are 
Insufficient to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Impermissible 
Discrimination 
One guideline courts have looked to regarding whether a particular 
legislative redistricting was constitutionally permissible was determining if 
the deviations from population equality crossed a so-called de minimis 
threshold.  In Brown v. Thomson,113 the Supreme Court held that “minor 
deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts 
[were] insufficient,” without further evidence, “to make out a prima facie 
case of” unconstitutional partisan “discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”114  The Brown Court further provided that apportionment 
plans with maximum population deviations of under ten percent fell within 
this category of “minor deviations.”115  However, the Court did not state 
that apportionment plans with less than ten percent population deviations 
may not be found discriminatory; rather, it said that such a small deviation 
would not constitute sufficient evidence in and of itself.116  This careful 
language may have been in response to the Court’s opinion in Roman, 
which stated “it is neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid math-
ematical standards for evaluating the constitutional validity of a state legis-
lative apportionment scheme under the Equal Protection Clause.”117  This 
permissive reading of the de minimis standard was adopted by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Daly v. Hunt,118 in which the 
court held that the Brown ten percent threshold does not “completely insu-
late” a state districting plan from attack, but instead only served as a marker 
                                                          
 110.  Id. at 293. 
 111.  Id. at 292 (“[T]hese four dissenters come up with three different standards—all of them 
different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants . . . .”). 
 112.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 113.  462 U.S. 835 (1983). 
 114.  Id. at 842 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). 
 118.  93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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which allowed a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of invidious dis-
crimination from statistical evidence alone.119  The Fourth Circuit stated in 
Daly that petitioners addressing plans with smaller population disparities 
may still succeed if they are able to produce additional evidence demon-
strating “that the apportionment process had a ‘taint of arbitrariness or dis-
crimination.’”120 
In 2004, the Supreme Court suggested that the ten percent deviation 
was not a safe harbor by summarily affirming, without decision, a U.S. Dis-
trict Court decision finding that a Georgia state legislative redistricting plan 
with population deviations under ten percent was nevertheless constitution-
ally infirm.121  Moreover, the Court so held despite the fact that just one 
election had been held between the enactment of the redistricting plan and 
the judicial review of the plan’s constitutionality.122  This result stood in 
contravention of the plurality view in Davis, which stated that the Court had 
found “equal protection violations only where a history of disproportionate 
results appeared in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of political pow-
er and the denial of fair representation.”123 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In In re 2012 Legislative Districting,124 the Maryland Court of Appeals 
upheld the legislative apportionment plan put in place by Maryland follow-
ing the 2010 United States Census, finding that it did not constitute imper-
missible partisan discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause.125  The Court of Appeals’ analysis focused primarily on 
two questions: (1) whether partisan discrimination is a permissible aim of 
the Maryland legislature in legislative reapportionment, and if so, what lim-
its should be placed on such discrimination; and (2) whether such partisan 
discrimination took place in the Redistricting Plan. 
The Houser petitioners argued, inter alia, that the intent of the Redis-
tricting Plan was to “punish Republicans and reward Democrats.”126  As a 
threshold matter, the Court of Appeals reiterated its 2002 holding in In re 
                                                          
 119.  Id. at 1220. 
 120.  Id. (quoting Roman, 377 U.S. at 710). 
 121.  Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 122.  Id. at 1327. 
 123.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986). 
 124.  436 Md. 121, 80 A.3d 1073 (2013). 
 125.  Id. at 179, 80 A.3d at 1106–07.  N.b., the Redistricting Plan was challenged by multiple 
groups of petitioners, who brought claims on multiple grounds.  Id. at 130, 138, 144, 159–60, 80 
A.3d at 1077, 1082, 1086, 1094–95.  For the purposes of this Note, however, the discussion will 
be focused on the Court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis and how it fits into the greater discus-
sion regarding political gerrymandering. 
 126.  Id. at 161, 80 A.3d at 1095 (quoting Petition of Cynthia Houser, et al., May 1, 2012) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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Legislative Districting of the State127 that “so long as the [Redistricting 
Plan] does not contravene the constitutional criteria, that it may have been 
formulated in an attempt to preserve communities of interest, to promote 
regionalism, to help or injure incumbents or political parties, or to achieve 
other social or political objectives, will not affect its validity.”128  Without 
citing Daly, the Court of Appeals then proceeded to essentially apply the 
burden-shifting framework described by the Fourth Circuit in that deci-
sion.129  The Court of Appeals noted that the ten percent rule serves as one 
way for a petitioner to establish a prima facie case of invalidity of the Re-
districting Plan.130  To the extent the ten percent rule has not been violated, 
as was the case in the 2012 Maryland redistricting,131 a challenger may still 
create a prima facie showing by demonstrating that “the deviation was de-
liberately created in furtherance of intentional impermissible racial, politi-
cal, or regional discrimination.”132  The conspicuously partisan groups 
formed to create redistricting plans133 are thus empowered to create plans 
designed to “help or injure incumbents or political parties,” while being 
chastened to not create plans in furtherance of “intentional impermissible 
political discrimination,” and are offered no guidance regarding where that 
line is drawn. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Special Master that 
nothing in the record indicated the drafter’s intent to discriminate or sup-
ported an inference of deliberate partisan discrimination.134  The Court of 
Appeals distinguished the Maryland Redistricting Plan from the Georgia 
state legislative redistricting plan analyzed and ultimately overturned by the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Larios v. Cox135 
(“the Georgia Plan”).136  The Larios decision was affirmed without opinion 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.137  After providing an exhaustive account of the 
evidence presented in Larios, the Court of Appeals emphasized the absence 
of similar evidence supporting intent to discriminate,138  including the sta-
                                                          
 127.  370 Md. 312, 805 A.2d 292 (2002). 
 128.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 133, 80 A.3d at 1079–80 (quoting In re 
Legislative Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 321–22, 805 A.2d at 297). 
 129.  See supra Part II.C. 
 130.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 164, 80 A.3d at 1097 (citing the Special 
Master Report, which the Court of Appeals adopts in relevant part). 
 131.  The Redistricting Plan’s maximum deviation is 9.41%.  See supra Part I. 
 132.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 164, 80 A.3d at 1097–98 (quoting Special 
Master Report at 53) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133.  See supra Part I. 
 134.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 179, 80 A.3d at 1098, 1106–07. 
 135.  300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 136.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 170–76, 80 A.3d at 1101–04. 
 137.  542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 138.  The Court of Appeals explained that: 
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tistical support for an inference of partisan discrimination, in the case under 
review.139  The Court of Appeals concluded that “the quality of the evi-
dence in this case,” both direct and circumstantial, did not measure up to the 
evidence provided in Larios.140  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found 
that the petitioners had failed to rebut the presumption of validity attaching 
to the Redistricting Plan by demonstrating impermissible political discrimi-
nation.141 
The Court of Appeals did not provide any bright line rule;142 nor did it 
clarify whether statistical evidence could, on its own, create an inference of 
partisan discrimination sufficient to invalidate a legislative reapportionment 
plan.143  Instead, the stronger statistical evidence and the existence of evi-
dence suggesting intent to discriminate present in Larios were sufficient for 
the Court to differentiate the Redistricting Plan from the Georgia Plan and 
uphold the Special Master’s finding that the Maryland petitioners had failed 
to advance evidence of the “quality” presented in Larios.144  Accordingly, 
                                                          
The creators of the state plans did not consider such traditional redistricting criteria as 
district compactness, contiguity, protecting communities of interest, and keeping coun-
ties intact.  . . . Rather, they had two expressly enumerated objectives: the protection of 
rural Georgia and inner-city Atlanta against a relative decline in their populations com-
pared with that of the rest of the state and the protection of Democratic incumbents. 
In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. at 170, 80 A.3d at 1101 (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 
2d at 1325). 
 139.  The Georgia legislative reapportionment plan,  
ha[d] a total population deviation range of 9.98% and an average deviation of 3.47%.  
The House districts deviate from ideal equal population by a range of +4.99% to 
−4.99%, with the largest district having 176,939 persons (in a four-member district) and 
the smallest district having 43,209 persons.  Notably, ninety of the 180 House seats 
(50.00%) are in districts with population deviations greater than ± 4%.  Sixty seats 
(33.33%) are in districts with deviations greater than ± 4.5%, and twenty seats (11.11%) 
are in districts with deviations greater than ± 4.9%.  The most underpopulated districts 
are primarily Democratic-leaning, and the most overpopulated districts are primarily 
Republican-leaning.  Moreover, most of the districts with negative deviations of 4% or 
greater are located either in south Georgia or within inner-city Atlanta. 
Id. at 171, 80 A.3d at 1102 (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1326) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 140.  Id. at 179, 80 A.3d at 1106. 
 141.  Id. at 164–65, 80 A.3d at 1106–07. 
 142.  In fact, the Court of Appeals explicitly refused to address whether the ten percent rule 
established a safe haven, or whether other evidence of an intent to discriminate could succeed de-
spite a State failing to cross the ten percent threshold in population difference between districts.  
Id. at 169, 80 A.3d at 1100. 
 143.  Id. at 179, 80 A.3d at 1106. 
 144.  The Court of Appeals stated:  
As we see it, [the Special Master] was comparing the quality of the evidence, both di-
rect and circumstantial, supporting the unconstitutional determination in Larios, all of 
which went to the proof of discriminatory or arbitrary intent, with that offered in this 
case, and, after that comparison, he found the evidence in this case lacking. And be-
cause the evidence in Larios consisted of both direct and circumstantial evidence, all of 
which tended to prove the intent of the plan’s drafters, and collectively, directly so, the 
reference to “the kind of evidence presented in Larios that might directly show” the 
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the Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that it should rely on Larios in 
finding that the Redistricting Plan constituted unconstitutional partisan dis-
crimination.145 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In the decades since Davis v. Bandemer,146 the Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims and 
the impermissibility of severe partisan discrimination, but has failed to pro-
vide an administrable standard for what rises to the level of severe partisan 
discrimination.147  The actual standard articulated by the plurality in Davis 
would, in practice, render insufficient virtually every claim of unconstitu-
tional partisan discrimination.148  The confusion produced by this lack of a 
practicable standard has led directly to decisions like that of the Court of 
Appeals in In re 2012 Legislative Districting.149  The Court of Appeals 
should have followed the lead of the Larios court and struck down the 2012 
Legislative Redistricting Plan as unconstitutional partisan gerrymander-
ing.150  Moreover, the ten percent rule, developed by the courts as a way to 
shift the burden onto the state in cases of conspicuously uneven districts, is 
now a relic of a time before legislators had access to advanced modeling 
software to use in redistricting.151  The judiciary’s ongoing failure to craft 
an effective solution to the important issue of partisan gerrymandering will 
continue to have a deleterious effect on the American public’s faith in the 
electoral process, which over time has inflicted and will continue to inflict 
profound harm on our democracy.152 
A.  The Supreme Court Has Consistently Upheld the Justiciability of 
Political Gerrymandering Claims and the Impermissibility of 
Severe Partisan Discrimination but Has Failed to Provide a 
Practicable Standard 
Decades of Supreme Court precedent stand for the premises that (a) 
political gerrymandering claims are justiciable;153 and (b) severe partisan 
                                                          
drafters’ intent, is no more than a recognition that the quality of the evidence in this 
case did not measure up to that in Larios. 
Id. 
 145.  Id., 80 A.3d 1106–07. 
 146.  478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 147.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 148.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 149.  436 Md. 121, 80 A.3d 1073 (2013). 
 150.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 151.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 152.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 153.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986). 
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discrimination in state legislative redistricting is impermissible.154  What is 
far less clear, despite three national censuses since Davis v. Bandemer and 
all of the concomitant judicial challenges to subsequent state redistricting 
plans, is what exactly elevates discrimination to the required level of im-
permissibility.155  The Davis plurality stated that a successful plaintiff must 
show both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group 
and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.156  The Davis plurality 
clarified that one election would not be sufficient to demonstrate a discrim-
inatory effect;157 rather, a petitioner must show that a group of voters had 
their influence on the political process “consistently degrade[d],”158 which 
required a showing of “a history of disproportionate results . . . in conjunc-
tion with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair rep-
resentation.”159 
The problem with this standard, as lower courts have come to find, is 
that it is practically impossible to meet, a fact that Justice Scalia happily 
pointed out writing for the Vieth plurality.160  This is true not just because of 
the Davis plurality’s assurance that some partisan discrimination was una-
voidable,161 but also because when states have a census every ten years, 
meeting the burden of showing a “history of disproportionate results” is 
simply not possible.  The Vieth plurality provided a laundry list of cases al-
leging unconstitutional partisan discrimination under the Davis standard 
                                                          
 154.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–93; Davis, 478 U.S. at 132–34; Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 
185, 187 (1971); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 
1320, 1351 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
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judicially discernable standards might be . . . lower courts have lived with that assurance of a 
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 156.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 127. 
 157.  Id. at 135. 
 158.  Id. at 132. 
 159.  Id. at 139. 
 160.  The plurality in Vieth wrote that application of the Davis standard, such as it is, 
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has been refused.  As one commentary has put it, “[t]hroughout its subsequent history, 
Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much pro-
spect of redress.”  The one case in which relief was provided (and merely preliminary 
relief, at that) did not involve the drawing of district lines; in all of the cases we are 
aware of involving that most common form of political gerrymandering, relief was de-
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541 U.S. at 279–80 (footnote call number omitted) (citation omitted)(quoting SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN & RICHARD PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 886 (rev. 2d ed. 
2002)). 
 161.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 128–29. 
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where relief was denied162 and found none where relief was granted.163  As 
a result, lower courts invalidating state redistricting plans have ignored the 
burden of proof from Davis by characterizing partisan discrimination claims 
as “one person, one vote” claims rather than “gerrymandering” claims.164  
As the Court of Appeals explained, however, this is often a distinction 
without a difference—as occurred in the Maryland case, petitioners will of-
ten aver that partisan gerrymandering is occurring by way of a deviation 
from “one person, one vote” requirements.165 
The failure of the Supreme Court to provide clear and meaningful 
guidance on this issue has led to decisions like that of the Court of Appeals 
in In re 2012 Legislative Districting.  In its decision, the Court of Appeals 
held on the one hand that “help[ing] or injur[ing] incumbents or political 
parties” is a permissible goal of the State legislature in redistricting,166 
while on the other hand, the Court of Appeals cited an absence of sufficient 
evidence of an intent to discriminate on the basis of politics as one of the 
primary ways that In re 2012 Legislative Districting was distinguishable 
from Larios.167  Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, the Governor’s 
Redistricting Advisory Committee’s intent to discriminate was simultane-
ously unavoidable and absent. 
To further demonstrate this confusion, the Court of Appeals provided 
that when the ten percent rule had not been violated, a challenger may still 
create a prima facie showing by demonstrating that “the deviation was de-
liberately created in furtherance of intentional impermissible racial, politi-
cal, or regional discrimination.”168  However, the crucial word “impermis-
sible” is not defined anywhere in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.  Given the 
court’s explicit holding that “help[ing] or injur[ing] incumbents or political 
parties” is a permissible aim of legislatures in creating redistricting plans,169 
this lack of clarity is particularly noteworthy. 
                                                          
 162.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280 n.6 (collecting cases). 
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B.  The Operative Standard for What Constitutes Permissible Partisan 
Discrimination Is Unreasonably Accommodating 
The Court of Appeals cited no support for its position that political 
aims were a permissible goal in the redistricting process;170 thus, to evaluate 
this assertion, the Supreme Court cases providing reasoning for this same 
assertion must be evaluated.  The Davis Court provided two main reasons 
for this ruling: (1) that political considerations of this sort were inherently 
unavoidable;171 and (2) that “[p]olitics and political considerations are in-
separable from districting and apportionment,” and a “politically mindless” 
approach may nevertheless produce gerrymandered results.172  Neither of 
these justifications withstand scrutiny.  First, political considerations may 
be separated from redistricting by separating politicians from redistricting.  
Several states have created non-partisan redistricting commissions to con-
duct redistricting.  Moreover, sophisticated mapping software allows groups 
creating redistricting plans to create such plans with extreme precision. 
Six states have separated politics from redistricting by creating non-
partisan redistricting commissions to conduct redistricting.173  For example, 
California created a Citizens Redistricting Commission for the State of Cal-
ifornia, which in turn created a non-partisan panel to sift through over 
36,000 applicants to create a group of sixty of the most qualified applicants, 
consisting of twenty from each political subgroup (Democrats, Republicans, 
and Independents).174  Republican and Democratic leaders were then al-
lowed discretionary strikes to remove twenty-four applicants from the pool, 
and the panel then chose the first eight members of the Redistricting Com-
mission from the remaining thirty-six applicants.175  Those eight members 
then chose the remaining six members of the Redistricting Commission.176  
The non-partisan fourteen-member Redistricting Commission proceeded to 
create a new legislative reapportionment scheme following the 2010 census 
                                                          
 170.  With the exception of citing its own 2002 decision, which itself did not cite any other 
decision in support of the proposition. 
 171.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
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 172.  Id. at 128–29 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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using an open, transparent, and non-political process.177  While this process 
may be onerous, it nevertheless gives lie to the assertion that “political con-
siderations are inseparable from districting.”178  Moreover, software devel-
opers are regularly coming out with new and increasingly effective models 
for neutral redistricting methods that create districts that are compact and 
equal in population.179  The status quo is not intractable. 
Second, the Supreme Court described gerrymandering in Kirkpatrick 
v. Preisler180 as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district bounda-
ries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes.”181  Thus, 
when the Davis Court states that a “politically mindless approach may pro-
duce . . . the most grossly gerrymandered results,”182 this does not stand to 
reason.  A politically mindless approach is, by definition, not doing any-
thing deliberately.  As a result, this argument in favor of a permissive atti-
tude toward partisan discrimination in redistricting, which has survived 
largely unquestioned from Davis to In re 2012 Legislative Districting,183 is 
without merit. 
The Davis plurality’s defeatist attitude toward addressing partisan dis-
crimination in redistricting was later adopted by the Court of Appeals.  
Without citation, the Court of Appeals stated in a 2002 decision184 that be-
cause the redistricting process was “a political one,” the fact that the plan 
had been formulated “to help or injure incumbents or political parties” 
would not affect its validity.185  In other words, because intent to discrimi-
nate is unavoidable, such intent is therefore insufficient to establish consti-
tutionally impermissible partisan discrimination.  While the majority opin-
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 178.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
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ion did not cite Davis,186 this represents one of the main findings provided 
by the Davis plurality.187 
Some equal protection scholars may scoff at the notion that intent to 
discriminate may, by itself, represent a constitutional violation—after all, it 
is well-established in equal protection law that a constitutional violation re-
quires intent plus effects.188  However, applying structurally analogous 
equal protection law from the disparate impact field, it is clear that in cer-
tain circumstances, intent may be inferred from effects.189  While the Larios 
court had the luxury of direct evidence of discriminatory intent,190 that deci-
sion likewise suggested a willingness to accept circumstantial evidence, 
even evidence falling short of the ten percent threshold, as proof of discrim-
inatory intent.191  Particularly in light of the precision with which legislators 
are able to create district maps using today’s advanced redistricting soft-
ware, continuing to require both intent and effects in this area ignores the 
realities of the technical capabilities of current legislators. 
Finally, even if the argument that some partisan discrimination is una-
voidable is accepted at face value, sophisticated mapping technology exists 
to make the redistricting process more neutral.  As the Larios court stated, 
“the Supreme Court has never sanctioned partisan advantage as a legitimate 
justification for population deviations.”192  Courts should apply the Equal 
Protection Clause to partisan gerrymandering cases in such a way as to lim-
it, to the extent possible, that inherently illegitimate end.  In that light, the 
current de minimis standard of ten percent is unjustifiably large given the 
technology that exists today.193  The most popular such application in exist-
ence today, Maptitude, advertises that “[i]t is used by a super-majority of 
                                                          
 186.  The Davis opinion is cited in the dissenting opinion in support of the premise that the 
redistricting plan cannot be found unconstitutional as the petitioners failed to demonstrate an actu-
al discriminatory effect.  In re Legislative Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 384, 805 A.2d at 334 
(Raker, J., dissenting).  
 187.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (“The plurality concluded that a political 
gerrymandering claim could succeed only where plaintiffs showed ‘both intentional discrimina-
tion against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.’”  
(quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 127)). 
 188.  See supra Part II. 
 189.  See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of 
the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.”). 
 190.  Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (“The creators of the state 
plans . . . had two expressly enumerated objectives: the protection of rural Georgia and inner-city 
Atlanta against a relative decline in their populations compared with that of the rest of the state 
and the protection of Democratic incumbents.”), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 191.  Id. at 1352 (“[W]hile a 9.98% total deviation is not presumptively unconstitutional, the 
plans’ drafters pushed the deviation as close to the 10% line as they thought they could get away 
with, conceding the absence of an ‘honest and good faith effort’ to construct equal districts.”). 
 192.  Id. at 1351. 
 193.  See Wang, supra note 2 (“Professionals use proprietary software to draw districts, but 
free software like Dave’s Redistricting App lets you do it from your couch.”). 
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the state legislatures, political parties, and public interest groups.”194  Map-
titude allows a user to control for virtually every possible factor or outcome 
affecting or resulting from redistricting, including past election results, 
compactness, population deviation, race, communities of interest, and past 
legislative apportionment plans.195 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the majority of state legislative dis-
tricts have been drawn so that the maximum population deviation falls “be-
tween 9 and 10% in at least one, and usually both, houses of their state leg-
islatures.”196  The fact that state legislators who know the line is drawn at 
ten percent systematically place their maximum population deviation be-
tween nine and ten percent suggests that if the line were drawn at five per-
cent, the majority of states could place their maximum population deviation 
between four and five percent.  The capabilities of the technology available 
today—in fact, the technology available a decade ago—is well-illustrated 
by Larios, in which the State produced a maximum population deviation of 
9.98% and drew a full third of its districts with a population deviation of 
greater than 4.5%.197  Given how well-documented the control that state 
legislatures exercise over their legislative redistricting process has become, 
redistricting plans containing maximum population polarization deviations 
between nine and ten percent can no longer be said to have constituted a 
“good faith” effort to create a plan “free from any taint of arbitrariness or 
discrimination” as required by Roman.198 
C.  The Stronger Public Policy Arguments Favor a More Stringent 
Standard for Evaluating the Constitutionality of State Legislative 
Redistricting 
Having established the strong likelihood that states can be held closer 
to “one person, one vote,” it remains to explain why they should be so con-
strained.  The easy answer, of course, is because, according to Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Equal Protection Clause says as much.199  There are, however, 
practical reasons that support limiting gerrymandering as well.  The two 
                                                          
 194.  CALIPER, MAPTITUDE SOFTWARE, DATA, AND SERVICES FOR REDISTRICTING 1, availa-
ble at http://www.caliper.com/PDFs/Maptitude%20for%20Redistricting%20Brochure.pdf. 
 195.  Id. at 2–6. 
 196.  James R. Dalton, Note, Making Politics De Minimis in the Political Process: The Un-
workable Implications of Cox v. Larios in State Legislative Redistricting and Reapportionment, 
BYU L. REV. 1999, 2000 & n.12 (2004) (“Of forty-seven states surveyed after the 2000 U.S. Cen-
sus, twenty-nine had district deviations in excess of 9%.). 
 197.  In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 436 Md. 121, 171, 80 A.3d 1073, 1102 (2013) (quot-
ing Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d, at 1326). 
 198.  Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). 
 199.  377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an 
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable.”). 
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largest reasons in support of fighting to end partisan discrimination in redis-
tricting are (1) maintaining (or restoring) the public’s faith in the electoral 
process, and (2) preventing (or reversing) harmful political polarization.  
Both of these issues are profoundly important to the strength of the Ameri-
can democracy and are important public interests for courts and legislatures 
to bear in mind when addressing these issues. 
The one unassailable negative effect gerrymandering has on the politi-
cal process is negatively affecting voter turnout.  In a June 2008 report writ-
ten by the Democratic Leadership Council, the organization reported that 
“[o]n average, 214,000 voters cast ballots in each of the 60 most competi-
tive House races run in 2006.  In 60 of the least competitive elections 
(where members won by between 50 and 90 percentage points), only 
153,000 voters came out to have their choices counted—28 percent few-
er.”200  According to Nolan McCarty, the Susan Dod Brown Professor of 
Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, a more general problem 
is one of perception: “A key to any successful democracy is a widespread 
belief in the fairness and impartiality of elections.  Having incumbents par-
ticipate in designing districts promoting their job security does little to en-
hance the legitimacy of American democracy.”201 
Gerrymandering may also be a cause of political polarization, not just 
in Maryland but across the nation.  Political columnist David Broder ob-
served that “[g]errymandered, one-party districts tend to send highly parti-
san representatives to the House or the legislature, contributing to the grid-
lock in government that is so distasteful to voters.”202  While there is 
scholarly writing contradicting the intuitive notion that gerrymandering 
would lead to polarization,203 the issue is far from settled.  The intuitive line 
of thought is reasonable and supported by the evidence: Republicans have 
controlled the majority of the state legislatures during the last two census 
cycles and have used those advantages to more firmly entrench their state 
and federal legislative majorities.204  The number of “swing districts” in the 
                                                          
 200.  MARC DUNKELMAN, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COUNCIL GERRYMANDERING THE 
VOTE 2 (2008), available at http://www.dlc.org/specials/Gerrymandering_the_Vote.pdf. 
 201.  Nolan McCarty, Hate Our Polarized Politics?  Why You Can’t Blame Gerrymandering., 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hate-our-polarized-
politics-why-you-cant-blame-gerrymandering/2012/10/26/c2794552-1d80-11e2-9cd5-
b55c38388962_story.html. 
 202.  David S. Broder, Voting’s Neglected Scandal, WASH. POST (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/25/AR2008062501944.html. 
 203.  See McCarty, supra note 201 (“[T]here is little systematic evidence to support the claim 
that gerrymandering has had a substantial effect on polarization.  In fact, there is considerable evi-
dence that it has played at most a tiny role.”). 
 204.  Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, N.Y. TIMES 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Dec. 27, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/as-
swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand/ (“Republicans were in charge of the redistrict-
ing process in many states, and they made efforts to shore up their incumbents, while packing 
Democrats into a few overwhelmingly Democratic districts.”). 
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U.S. House of Representatives has dropped from 103 districts in 1992 to 
approximately 35 in 2012.205  When legislators run in districts wherein they 
do not face serious challenges from the opposing party, their larger concern 
becomes an intraparty (primary) challenge, causing the incumbent legislator 
to move to the political poles.206 
Finally, it is important to note that this partisan discrimination has sig-
nificantly helped the electoral outcomes for Maryland Democrats.  In 2014, 
Maryland held its first state election since the 2012 redistricting plan was 
adopted.207  In that election, GOP candidates for State Senate received ap-
proximately forty-one percent of the vote.208  Despite that, those candidates 
won just 14 of 47, or 29.8%, of the total Maryland State Senate seats.209  
Similar effects of redistricting have affected the federal legislature.  In 
2012, Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives re-
ceived 54,301,095 total votes as compared to 53,822,442 received by Re-
publican candidates.210  Despite that seeming victory in total votes, the Re-
publicans won control of the House by a 234 to 201 margin.211  Thus, like 
the Maryland Democrats, the congressional Republicans have been signifi-
cantly and unfairly advantaged by similarly gerrymandered districts in Re-
publican-controlled states. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If Davis, Vieth, and In re 2012 Legislative Districting are indicative of 
anything, it is that some of the concerns expressed by the Reynolds Court 
about the risks of “entering into political thickets and mathematical quag-
                                                          
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Ezra Klein, The 13 Reasons Washington Is Failing, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 7, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/07/the-13-reasons-
washington-is-failing/ (“[I]n recent decades the parties have polarized.  According to the respected 
DW-Nominate system, which measures party polarization, the two parties have never been further 
apart in Congress.”). 
 207.  All seats in the Maryland General Assembly—the Maryland Senate and Maryland House 
of Delegates—are up for election every four years.  See General Assembly, MARYLAND MANUAL 
ON-LINE, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/07leg/html/gaf.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014). 
 208.  See Official 2014 Gubernatorial General Election Results for State Senator, MARYLAND 
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, 
http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2014/results/General/gen_results_2014_2_015X.html (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2014).  Included as Appendix A is an Excel spreadsheet in which the 2014 Mary-
land State Senator election results are summed. 
 209.  Maryland State Senate Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_State_Senate_elections,_2014 (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
 210.  Ezra Klein, House Democrats Got More Votes Than House Republicans.  Yet Boehner 
Says He’s Got a Mandate?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/11/09/house-democrats-got-more-
votes-than-house-republicans-yet-boehner-says-hes-got-a-mandate/. 
 211.  See Wang, supra note 2. 
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mires”212 are reasonable ones.  The Reynolds Court, however, stated, the 
fact that such claims are difficult to resolve does not mean the courts should 
shrink from their important responsibility in this area.  It is well established 
that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  Moreover, dominant political parties within many states and 
from both parties have proven incapable of self-restraint in this area and 
have frequently discriminated against minority parties to the greatest extent 
permitted.213  Courts must serve as a bulwark against this harm.  The Court 
of Appeals’ failure to do so here is a discouraging sign of things to come. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
  VOTES REPRESENTATION 
DEM: 947,240 33/47 
REP: 655,037 14/47 
TOTAL: 1,614,526   
REP. PERCENT: 0.405714742 0.29787234 
 
 
 
Name Legis.  District Party 
Early 
Voting 
Election 
Day 
Absentee / 
Provision-
als 
Total 
Votes % 
Edwards, G. 1 REP 2,694 26,434 1,246 30,374 99.2 
Other 1   24 203 13 240 0.8 
Shank, C. 2 REP 2,184 22,836 1,003 26,023 98.1 
Other 2   88 392 24 504 1.9 
Young, R. 3 DEM 3,363 14,089 855 18,307 50.8 
Stottlemyer, C. 3 REP 2,352 14,573 768 17,693 49.1 
Other 3   8 49 2 57 0.2 
Rupli, D. 4 DEM 2,102 12,247 524 14,873 32.1 
Hough, M. 4 REP 2,871 27,588 955 31,414 67.7 
Other 4   16 92 9 117 0.3 
Riley, A. 5 DEM 1,772 8,037 394 10,203 21.4 
Getty, J. 5 REP 4,938 31,426 1,042 37,406 78.5 
Other 5   6 48 4 58 0.1 
Olszewski, J. 6 DEM 2,744 10,868 453 14,065 44.9 
                                                          
 212.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
 213.  See Levitt, supra note 173 (noting that only a small number of states—namely, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and Washington—have thus far established independent 
commissions that take the redistricting process out of the hands of interested politicians and which 
are responsible for devising politically neutral legislative districts); Dalton, supra note 196 (“Of 
forty-seven states surveyed after the 2000 U.S. Census, twenty-nine had district deviations in ex-
cess of 9%.” (citation omitted)). 
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Name Legis.  District Party 
Early 
Voting 
Election 
Day 
Absentee / 
Provision-
als 
Total 
Votes % 
Salling, J. 6 REP 3,038 11,549 329 14,916 47.7 
Collier, S. 6 UNA 429 1,787 69 2,285 7.3 
Other 6   5 17 4 26 0.1 
Letke, K. 7 DEM 2,396 9,751 355 12,502 25.3 
Jennings, J. 7 REP 6,559 29,432 922 36,913 74.6 
Other 7   7 37 2 46 0.1 
Klausmeier, K. 8 DEM 4,267 18,674 697 23,638 61.2 
Lofstad, E. 8 REP 2,543 11,953 442 14,938 38.7 
Other 8   8 26 3 37 0.1 
Frederic, R. 9 DEM 3,791 12,745 596 17,132 34.1 
Bates, G. 9 REP 5,815 26,200 1,094 33,109 65.8 
Other 9   9 43 4 56 0.1 
Kelley, D. 10 DEM 9,542 19,910 996 30,448 98 
Other 10   100 327 12 439 2 
Zirkin, B. 11 DEM 5,746 22,983 1,472 30,201 97.5 
Other 11   132 604 29 765 2.5 
Kasemeyer, E. 12 DEM 5,195 15,865 926 21,986 58.6 
Pippy, J. 12 REP 2,431 12,453 597 15,481 41.3 
Other 12   8 39 0 47 0.1 
Guzzone, G. 13 DEM 4,802 19,303 921 25,026 62.3 
Venkatesan, J. 13 REP 1,999 12,663 464 15,126 37.6 
Other 13   1 25 0 26 0.1 
Montgomery, K. 14 DEM 4,221 16,929 1,075 22,225 57.5 
Howard, F. 14 REP 2,180 13,447 772 16,399 42.4 
Other 14   8 31 2 41 0.1 
Feldman, B. 15 DEM 2,425 16,113 1,387 19,925 60.4 
Ficker, R. 15 REP 1,140 10,601 1,287 13,028 39.5 
Other 15   3 39 2 44 0.1 
Lee, S. 16 DEM 2,447 23,572 2,584 28,603 70 
Marks, M. 16 REP 770 10,455 983 12,208 29.9 
Other 16   4 45 4 53 0.1 
Kagan, C. 17 DEM 2,687 14,438 1,401 18,526 68.1 
Zellers, S. 17 REP 950 6,930 616 8,496 31.2 
Other 17   17 141 11 169 0.6 
Madaleno, R. 18 DEM 3,415 20,402 1,723 25,540 97.6 
Other 18   81 509 42 632 2.4 
Manno, R. 19 DEM 3,748 16,818 1,464 22,030 67.7 
Gonzales, F. 19 REP 1,190 8,608 648 10,446 32.1 
Other 19   3 50 2 55 0.2 
Raskin, J. 20 DEM 4,939 19,857 1,674 26,470 98.7 
Other 20   55 278 26 359 1.3 
Rosapepe, J. 21 DEM 4,599 16,501 1,141 22,241 97.6 
Other 21   116 422 16 554 2.4 
Pinsky, P. 22 DEM 3,173 17,315 983 21,471 86.7 
Denise, J. 22 REP 318 2,744 183 3,245 13.1 
Other 22   1 34 0 35 0.1 
Peters, D. 23 DEM 9,723 24,762 1,519 36,004 98.8 
Other 23   76 351 19 446 1.2 
Benson, J. 24 DEM 6,825 21,578 1,289 29,692 99.2 
Other 24   78 149 11 238 0.8 
Currie, U. 25 DEM 7,082 20,843 1,172 29,097 91.9 
Boone, K. 25 REP 361 1,405 136 1,902 6 
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Name Legis.  District Party 
Early 
Voting 
Election 
Day 
Absentee / 
Provision-
als 
Total 
Votes % 
Other 25   68 575 14 657 2.1 
Muse, C. 26 DEM 6,942 21,793 1,018 29,753 89.6 
Howells, K. 26 REP 488 2,670 212 3,370 10.1 
Other 26   39 50 4 93 0.3 
Miller, T. 27 DEM 5,322 22,326 1,019 28,667 62.5 
Peed, J. 27 REP 2,484 14,081 603 17,168 37.4 
Other 27   8 50 4 62 0.1 
Middleton, M. 28 DEM 4,401 21,845 1,054 27,300 66.8 
Donnelly, A. 28 REP 1,624 11,373 496 13,493 33 
Other 28   7 52 2 61 0.1 
Dyson, R. 29 DEM 2,402 13,825 838 17,065 43.4 
Waugh, S. 29 REP 2,661 18,677 845 22,183 56.5 
Other 29   3 21 4 28 0.1 
Astle, J. 30 DEM 6,232 14,871 1,358 22,461 51.3 
Quinn, D. 30 REP 4,806 15,366 1,112 21,284 48.6 
Other 30   8 36 7 51 0.1 
Harman, A. 31 DEM 2,240 8,106 583 10,929 27.8 
Simonaire, B. 31 REP 4,648 22,728 962 28,338 72.1 
Other 31   5 27 2 34 0.1 
DeGrange, J. 32 DEM 4,054 14,007 1,041 19,102 59 
Barber, L. 32 REP 2,374 10,359 537 13,270 41 
Other 32   12 11 5 28 0.1 
Reilly, E. 33 REP 8,759 31,253 1,733 41,745 98 
Other 33   191 595 59 845 2 
James, M. 34 DEM 3,785 12,069 605 16,459 42.7 
Cassilly, B. 34 REP 4,186 17,088 768 22,042 57.2 
Other 34   20 40 2 62 0.2 
Kelly, B. 35 DEM 1,997 8,633 314 10,944 26 
Norman, W. 35 REP 4,820 25,444 801 31,065 73.9 
Other 35   1 31 1 33 0.1 
Tilghman, B. 36 DEM 3,683 9,450 479 13,612 32.8 
Hershey, S. 36 REP 6,184 20,849 843 27,876 67.1 
Other 36   7 19 4 30 0.1 
Robinson, C. 37 DEM 3,000 9,636 892 13,528 33.8 
Eckardt, A. 37 REP 5,742 19,495 1,160 26,397 65.9 
Other 37   17 92 12 121 0.3 
Mathias, J. 38 DEM 3,846 15,287 1,088 20,221 51.7 
McDermott, M. 38 REP 3,426 14,479 963 18,868 48.2 
Other 38   4 19 0 23 0.1 
King, N. 39 DEM 2,725 15,099 984 18,808 97.2 
Other 39   64 421 51 536 2.8 
Pugh, C. 40 DEM 2,789 15,916 1,081 19,786 98 
Other 40   25 358 12 395 2 
Gladden, L. 41 DEM 7,015 19,002 1,375 27,392 98.7 
Other 41   65 293 7 365 1.3 
Brochin, J. 42 DEM 3,525 19,290 1,161 23,976 51.6 
Robinson, T. 42 REP 2,798 18,527 1,084 22,409 48.3 
Other 42   7 38 3 48 0.1 
Conway, J. 43 DEM 5,909 18,594 1,163 25,666 98.2 
Other 43   90 369 24 483 1.8 
Pulliam, S. 44 DEM 6,551 18,805 905 26,261 80.2 
Reiter, B. 44 REP 1,409 4,735 268 6,412 19.6 
 680 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:653 
Name Legis.  District Party 
Early 
Voting 
Election 
Day 
Absentee / 
Provision-
als 
Total 
Votes % 
Other 44   11 40 0 51 0.2 
McFadden, N. 45 DEM 3,834 17,530 839 22,203 98.8 
Other 45   45 215 10 270 1.2 
Ferguson, B. 46 DEM 2,114 14,438 768 17,320 97.3 
Other 46   67 382 35 484 2.7 
Ramirez, V. 47 DEM 2,073 12,722 787 15,582 99 
Other 47   23 129 8 160 1 
 
